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The Law and Economics of Stop-and-Frisk
David Abrams*
The relevant economic and legal research relating to police use of
stop-and-frisk has largely been distinct. There is much to be gained by
taking an interdisciplinary approach. This Essay emphasizes some of
the challenges faced by those seeking to evaluate the efficacy and
legality of stop-and-frisk, and suggests some ways forward and areas of
exploration for future research.
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INTRODUCTION
Police use of the stop-and-frisk tactic is a subject that has garnered
much attention in the press recently.1 It has also been the focus of a

* Professor of Law, Business Economics, and Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania Law
School and the Wharton School. Email: dabrams@law.upenn.edu. The author would like to
thank Ashleigh Taylor for excellent research assistance as well as John MacDonald and
participants at Loyola University Chicago Law Journal’s “Sentence Structure: The Elements of
Punishment” Symposium on April 4, 2014 for their questions and comments. Special thanks to
David Rudovsky, without whom I would not have been introduced to this important topic.
1. See, e.g., Daniel Bergner, Is Stop-and-Frisk Worth It?, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 19, 2014, at
54 (discussing the role and value stop-and-frisks have played in New York from the perspective
of two police officers); Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2013, at A1 (discussing a ruling by a federal judge in New York holding the
stop-and-frisk tactics of the New York Police Department to be a violation of constitutional rights
of minorities); Patrick Walters, ACLU Files Lawsuit Challenging ‘Stop and Frisk’ Searches in
Philadelphia, IND. GAZETTE, Nov. 5, 2010, at 5 (discussing the litigation in which eight
individuals argue they were stopped without reason by Philadelphia police due to stop-and-frisk
tactics); Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on
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substantial amount of research by both legal academics and
economists.2 However, the conversation surrounding stop-and-frisk has
become fragmented: economic theorists consult largely with other
economists, advocates tend to discuss their cases with other advocates,
and often there is little communication across jurisdictions.
There is much to be learned from reaching across disciplines,
geographic regions, and perspectives. The splintered discussion has
slowed progress on the subject of stop-and-frisk, about which much
remains to be done. The goal of this Essay is to set forth a plan for
reinvigorating work on assessing the use of stop-and-frisk.
I begin by briefly summarizing the current lay of the land regarding
stop-and-frisk and then describe the legal issues and origins of the stopand-frisk tactic. Following this, I discuss the relevant economic
literature and explain its contributions. I then describe how stop-andfrisk programs are currently evaluated and set forth proposals for how
they should be evaluated. In particular, this Essay’s analysis addresses
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment issues involved in
economic evaluations of stop-and-frisk, and how they differ. While
there are difficulties in setting benchmarks for evaluating the legality of
the use of stop-and-frisk in real-world litigation—which may differ
markedly from assumptions made in economic models—I discuss the
balance I have tried to strike in my role as an expert in litigation in
Philadelphia. As an informative case study, I note the substantial
differences between recent litigation in Philadelphia and New York
City. I conclude with some thoughts on the challenge of implementing
real reform.

Stop-and-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2014, at A1 (detailing the announcement made by
New York City’s mayor that the city would withdraw its appeal of the ruling that stop-and-frisk
searches were unconstitutional if the court approves the settlement agreement).
2. See, e.g., Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s
“Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS. 813
(2007) (analyzing data for NYPD stops which indicated that they were stopping blacks and
Hispanics more often than whites); David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and
Frisk Debate Beyond New York City, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 853 (2013) (discussing
the need for more data on stop-and-frisk to broaden the debate over the impact of race on criminal
justice); David Rudovsky & Lawrence Rosenthal, The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in New
York City, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 117 (2013) (discussing the constitutionality of stop-andfrisk searches and ultimately finding that both liability and remedial measures established in
Floyd were necessary); Decio Coviello & Nicola Persico, An Economic Analysis of Black-White
Disparities in NYPD’s Stop and Frisk Program (NBER Working Paper Series No. 18803, 2013),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18803 (analyzing data and attempting to determine the
reason for the discrimination among stops).
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Police officers often use stop-and-frisk, a tactic whereby officers may
stop an individual whom they suspect to be involved in criminal
activity, and frisk that individual given the officer’s belief that there is
some likelihood that the individual has a weapon.3 This tactic goes
back decades, but its use has increased substantially in the past ten to
fifteen years and has become a major tactic used by police departments
in large cities aimed at crime prevention.4 Police departments have
asserted that stop-and-frisk programs are responsible for a large
reduction in crime since the mid-1990s, although there is no reliable
evidence for this claim.5
The current legal framework for stop-and-frisk can be traced back to
the 1968 Supreme Court case Terry v. Ohio.6 There, the Court
articulated a reasonable suspicion standard (lower than the probable
cause standard required for a full search) for stopping and potentially
frisking an individual on the street or in a vehicle.7 The justification for
the lower standard to permit a search was that the person being stopped
and frisked was potentially armed and dangerous, and could harm
officers, themselves, or bystanders.8
Several cities across the United States have witnessed at least some
stop-and-frisk litigation in the past decade. Philadelphia and Los
Angeles each had a round of litigation in the early 2000s.9 New York’s
recent litigation has received a great deal of media coverage,10 while
Philadelphia experienced its second round of stop-and-frisk litigation

3. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1555 (9th ed. 2009) (defining stop-and-frisk as a “term
used to describe what happens when a suspect is detained and then searched for any weapons”).
4. See Harris, supra note 2, at 854 (discussing the increase in stop-and-frisks by the NYPD
from 97,000 in 2002 to nearly 700,000 in 2011).
5. Id. at 864.
6. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
7. Id. at 27.
8. Id. at 1.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that defendants’ Hispanic appearances were not enough to cause reasonable suspicion to justify
stopping them); Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 751 A.2d 1153, 1163 (Pa. 2000) (holding that the
seizure of drugs from Zhahir during a stop-and-frisk was permissible under the plain-feel
doctrine).
10. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 1 (discussing a federal judge’s holding that New York
stop-and-frisk tactics violated minorities’ constitutional rights); Colleen Long, Trial Opens for
NYC Stop-and-Frisk Challenge, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 19, 2013, available at http://bigstory.
ap.org/article/ny-stop-and-frisk-challenge-heads-federal-court (discussing the New York trial,
testimony and statistics with regards to stop-and-frisks); Weiser & Goldstein, supra note 1
(discussing Mayor de Blasio’s decision to settle the dispute over stop-and-frisks, which was a
divisive issue during his mayoral race, instead of continuing with the appeal).
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beginning in 2010.11 The relevant New York case is Floyd v. City of
New York,12 and the relevant Philadelphia case is Bailey v.
Philadelphia.13 The Department of Justice is actively involved in
ongoing stop-and-frisk litigation in a number of different locations,
including cities in California.14 Although Chicago has not had any
recent litigation, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has sent
present Mayor Rahm Emanuel letters requesting the collection of data
that would permit better evaluation of the Chicago Police Department’s
practices.15
At the heart of most stop-and-frisk litigation lie two constitutional
issues: the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable search
and seizure,16 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause,17 each of which I discuss in turn below. Since the earliest stopand-frisk litigation, scholars and lawmakers have scrutinized and
attempted to resolve problems with stop-and-frisk programs. A
shortcoming of some of these attempts is the absence of an
interdisciplinary perspective. One disciplinary perspective that can help
inform many stop-and-frisk questions is the economic one.
II. ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS
Economists are very good at thinking about the incentives of different
actors in the criminal justice system, and how to detect disparities that
may indicate discrimination. This line of economic research originated

11. The case, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, was ultimately settled in 2011. Settlement
Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa.
June 21, 2011) (No. 10-cv-05952).
12. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
13. See Complaint, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, 2010 WL 4662865 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2010)
(No. 2:10-cv-05925). I have been involved with Bailey as a statistical expert on behalf of the
plaintiffs, and Professor Jeffrey Fagan of Columbia University has been the statistical expert in
the Floyd case.
14. See, e.g., United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal at
20, United States v. City of New Orleans, 2014 WL 3706621 (E.D. La. June 25, 2014) (No. 1330161) (asking the court to deny the motion to stay to trigger police reform); Statement of Interest
by the United States at 3–4, Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (D. Ariz. 2013)
(No. 07-cv-02513) (discussing the need to ensure that the unconstitutional practice is adequately
remedied); Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department - Antelope Valley: Statement of Intent,
July 27, 2013, available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/antelope_statementofi
ntent_6-28-13.pdf (detailing a statement of intent to reach a settlement agreement between the
parties to resolve issues identified by the DOJ).
15. Letter from ACLU to Rahm Emanuel, Steve Patton & Garry McCarthy (Jan. 15, 2013),
available at http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Letter-to-Emanuel-Patton-McCa
rthy-1-15-13.pdf.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

ABRAMS PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

The Law and Economics of Stop-and-Frisk

11/11/2014 5:56 PM

373

in the 1960s with Nobel Laureate Gary Becker.18 The first well-known
article applying the economic perspective on discrimination to police
stops was published in 2001 in the Journal of Political Economy by
John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and Petra Todd.19 Their article
addresses a Fourteenth Amendment question regarding the detection of
racial discrimination in motor vehicle searches, which is very similar to
the stop-and-frisk context.20 They employ a simple model of stops that
leads to a very stark conclusion about the detection of racial disparities
in stops.21
In the model, a race-blind officer simply seeks to stop individuals
most likely to be in possession of contraband. When a police officer
seeks to detect contraband in a race-blind way, there may still be
unequal stop rates by race,22 possibly due to a variation in crime rates
by race. However, a race-blind police officer should stop individuals
such that the likelihood of discovering contraband is equal across
races.23
This perspective naturally leads to an evaluation approach called a
“hit-rate” analysis.24 The “hit-rate” is simply the percentage of stops in
which contraband is discovered. The insight of the Knowles, Persico,
and Todd paper is that one may evaluate the Fourteenth Amendment
compliance of policing by simply calculating and comparing hit-rates
by race.25 According to their theory, as long as hit rates are the same,
there is no evidence of racial bias, even if stop rates differ by race.
Since the 2001 paper, a number of economists who have written
about hit-rate analysis have questioned some of the paper’s basic
assumptions.26 These subsequent papers critique the Knowles, Persico,

18. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (Univ. Chicago Press 1957).
19. John Knowles, Nicola Persico & Petra E. Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches:
Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203 (2001).
20. Id. at 203.
21. Id. at 209.
22. Id. at 205.
23. Id. at 211.
24. See, e.g., Nicola Persico & Petra E. Todd, The Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in MotorVehicle Searches, 25 JUST. Q. 37 (2008) (discussing how a previously developed rational choice
model provides a test for detecting police bias in how they enforce the law).
25. See id. at 42.
26. Papers critical of the hit-rate approach include: Shamena Anwar & Hanming Fang, An
Alternative Test of Racial Prejudice in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 96 AM.
ECON. REV. 127 (2006); David Bjerk, Racial Profiling, Statistical Discrimination, and the Effect
of a Colorblind Policy on the Crime Rate, 9 J PUB. ECON. THEORY 521 (2007); William A. Brock
et al., On the Observational Implications of Taste-Based Discrimination in Racial Profiling, 166
J. ECONOMETRICS 66 (2012).
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and Todd paper and point out its limitations.27 For example, if one
assumes that police officers seek to achieve multiple objectives with a
stop, then the result vanishes.28 If some of the paper’s assumptions
change, then the analysis becomes much more complex. In fact, it
becomes so complicated that it is hard to know how one might perform
an analysis evaluating Fourteenth Amendment compliance of a realworld police department.
This begs the question: if the theory is so complicated, then how does
one evaluate a stop-and-frisk program when the law requires it? How
does an attorney determine if litigation is warranted? Or, if litigation
has already occurred, how does a statistical expert evaluate whether
police are implementing reforms that have produced substantial change?
Almost all of the current economic literature in the area focuses on
Fourteenth Amendment issues.29 One general trend in this literature
seems to be that the more realistic the models get, the less useful they
are for actual evaluation. The authors of these models are economic
theorists attempting to devise and solve simplified models that capture
the overall character of the problem. They are not involved in litigation
and therefore not bound by exigencies of responding to real-world facts
and constraints. In the absence of an interdisciplinary perspective, these
models will continue have limited utility in real-world evaluations.
III. CURRENT APPROACHES TO FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
So how does one go about solving this problem? On the one hand,
one may use the simpler results of the earlier hit-rate paper30 and adopt
their assumptions, which give a very clear method of analyzing actual
data. On the other hand, one may wish to use a more complicated
model, acknowledging that the world is complex. But in attempting to
apply the more detailed models, one may lose the ability to make any
evaluations at all, at least without substantial additional assumptions.
Perhaps the most commonly used approach to evaluate stop-and-frisk
27. See Anwar & Hanming, supra note 26, at 129 (discussing drawbacks to the Knowles,
Persico, and Todd (“KPT”) model); Bjerk, supra note 26, at 526 (assuming that officers observe a
signal of guilt from motorists, something KPT does not consider); Brock et al., supra note 26, at
67 (noting the restrictions in KPT).
28. For example, police may look for multiple types of contraband, or may look for suspects
in multiple cases.
29. See generally Rudovsky & Rosenthal, supra note 2 (discussing the Fourteenth
Amendment violations of stop-and-frisk practices as found in courts); Josephine Unger, Frisky
Business: Adapting New York City Policing Practices to Ameliorate Crime in Modern Day
Chicago, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 659 (2014) (stating that police officers’ racial targeting for
searches and seizures is a Fourteenth Amendment violation).
30. Knowles, Persico & Todd, supra note 19.
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programs is regression analysis. For example, in the Floyd litigation in
New York, Professor Jeffrey Fagan used regressions to estimate the
impact of race on stop rates, while attempting to control for other
factors.31 However, this approach is difficult to implement and interpret
because the researcher must determine which other factors to control
for. Should the researcher control for demographics of the area,
economic status of the neighborhood where people are being stopped,
other demographics of the area, or crime rates? These may already be a
function of what the police are doing, or the way the society is
structured. Does one control for police presence? Again, that might
already be a function of a police decision that was previously made. In
addition, there will always be control variables that the expert would
like to include but that are not available.
Indeed Fagan’s regression analysis finds racial disparity in New
York, while a recent paper by Decio Coviello and Nicola Persico32—
one of the co-authors of the hit-rate paper—analyzed the New York data
and found no racial disparity.33
IV. PRELIMINARY SUGGESTIONS FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Thus far, I have focused on the Fourteenth Amendment question, but
now I turn to the Fourth Amendment issue, which in some ways is even
more interesting. There has been almost no work done by economists
on the Fourth Amendment elements of these issues. This is perhaps
because the precise question is somewhat less clear and lends itself less
easily to economic analysis.
The Fourth Amendment issue ultimately comes down to a tradeoff
between liberty and safety. With stop-and-frisk, this means a balance
between the liberty to walk down the street without being stopped and
the safety that comes from not being victimized by crime or having fear
of such victimization. How might we think about this from an
economic perspective, given that both of these considerations are very
difficult to measure?
First, one must try to analyze and quantify stop-and-frisk’s impact on
safety. The preliminary question that must be answered is whether
stop-and-frisk actually reduces crime. While a large number of police
departments that use the tactic claim that it reduces crime, there is no
rigorous study that supports this assertion.

31. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153 (S.D.N.Y. May 16,
2012) (No. 08-cv-01034).
32. Coviello & Persico, supra note 2.
33. Id. at 18.
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So how might one go about determining the impact of stop-and-frisk
tactics on crime? One approach would be to use a difference-indifference design. In general, the difference-in-difference approach
allows for the evaluation of an intervention by comparing changes over
time in two otherwise very similar groups: one of which receives the
intervention and the other of which does not.
For example, consider a hypothetical where two precincts in South
Philadelphia have similar demographics, patterns of crime, police
presence, and other characteristics.
Perhaps due to budgetary
constraints one of the two precincts is chosen to implement a large
increase in the use of stop-and-frisk and the other is not. One measure
of the impact of stop-and-frisk would be the difference in crime rates
between the two precincts after the policy change (this is known as a
single difference). An even better measure may be obtained by
subtracting off the crime rates in each precinct before the increase in
stop-and-frisk. By looking at the difference in the change in crime rates
between the two precincts, one may control for pre-existing differences
in crime rates and isolate just the impact of the stop-and-frisk change.
Of course the difficulty of finding such examples in real life is what
makes estimating the impact of stop-and-frisk on crime particularly
challenging.
But even once we estimate the impact of stop-and-frisk on crime,
how can we measure the liberty aspect of stop-and-frisk? This is an
even greater empirical challenge, to which there is currently no good
answer. But progress can be made, even if we can only nail down the
safety half of the question, because ultimately the tradeoff is a political
one, made by aggregating how people individually trade off safety and
liberty. If we have good empirical estimates for the impact of stop-andfrisk on crime, then we can ask people precise questions about the
tradeoff.
For example one could pose survey questions such as:
A recent study determined that an increase from 200,000 to 300,000
stops per year would eliminate thirteen robberies and twenty-two
thefts a year. Would you be in favor of this change?
Alternatively,
Halving the current rate of stops from 200,000 to 100,000 per year
would result in an extra twenty robberies and thirty-two thefts per
year. Would you be in favor of this change?
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Responses may be dramatic. There may be a vast number of people
who believe that greater use of the stop-and-frisk tactic is necessary, or
the reverse could be true. But, at least if we quantify one part of the
equation, we can ask people about the other, because ultimately, striking
the right balance is a matter of aggregating individuals’ preferences
(while of course taking account of potential distributional issues).
While the economic approach to the Fourth Amendment analysis
described here is difficult, the legal approach currently in use is more
straightforward (see below) and involves a determination of the legal
sufficiency of the reason given for a stop.
V. RECENT EVALUATIONS IN PHILADELPHIA
AND NEW YORK CITY
The questions discussed here are ones with which economists,
scholars, policymakers, and litigators struggle. Having served as an
expert in the Bailey litigation in Philadelphia, I have been forced to
choose what I believe to be the best currently available tools to examine
the facts at hand. I describe my approach here as an example of how to
use insight from economic theory to inform practical analysis of realworld data.
In my work, I make use of both regression and hit-rate analysis in
studying Philadelphia stop-and-frisk data from 2010 to 2012. I have
found some evidence of racial disparities in this time period, but these
disparities vary over time in their strength and significance. In contrast,
the Fourth Amendment analysis results are very consistent and stark.
Concretely, the Fourth Amendment analysis incorporates two
approaches. Every time there is a stop in Philadelphia, a form must be
filled out by the police officer performing the stop.34 In one approach
for the Bailey analysis, attorneys David Rudovsky and Paul Messing
examine a sample of the stops and their explanations and analyze them
for legal sufficiency.35 This approach reveals that about 40–50% lack
legal basis for the stop; a figure that has been fairly consistent over the
last three years since Philadelphia entered into a consent decree.36
The second approach is to examine the fraction of the time that police
officers actually find a weapon, the suspected presence of which is the

34. Robert Moran, Detailed Police Reports to be Required in All Stops: The Longer Forms
are a Response to Concerns of Racial Profiling by Philadelphia Officers, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr.
17, 1999, at A01.
35. See Plaintiffs’ Fourth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices, Bailey v.
City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2013) (No. 2:10-cv-05952).
36. Id. at 4.
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justification for performing a frisk. In New York from 2003–2013,
approximately 1-in-50 frisks resulted in a weapon.37 In Philadelphia in
2012, approximately 1-in-600 stops resulted in a weapon.38 This then
may feed back to the question to citizens: “Does this rate seem
appropriate?” If individuals are extremely fearful of firearms and place
very little weight on liberty, then this rate may be appropriate, but
ultimately this is a political question.
It is interesting to contrast the legal strategies and the stop-and-frisk
rates of the cities of Philadelphia and New York over the past few years.
Philadelphia did not fight litigation in court, but instead chose to enter
into a consent decree to monitor its stop-and-frisk program.39 Contrast
this to New York, where the city actively fought litigation, went to
court, received a lot of press, and was openly very resistant to change.40
Philadelphia started out with a higher stop-and-frisk rate than New
York, with 253,000 stops in 2009 out of a population of about 1.5
million,41 versus 581,168 stops in New York for a population of about
8.4 million in the same year.42 Philadelphia’s rate of stop-and-frisk has
remained relatively the same since it entered into the consent decree,
with 215,000 stops per year in 2012,43 while New York’s rate has
dropped by more than half after the litigation began, to 191,558 stops in
2013.44 More than three years have passed since the consent decree in
Philadelphia was signed in 2011 and there remains the same high rate of
improper stops, an incredibly low rate of finding weapons and an

37. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Between
January 2004 and June 2012, the NYPD conducted over 4.4 million Terry stops . . . . [A] weapon
was found after 1.5% of these frisks.”); N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, STOP AND FRISK DURING
THE BLOOMBERG ADMINISTRATION (2002-2013), at 1 (2014) (“Of those frisked, a weapon was
found only two percent of the time.”).
38. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices, supra note 35,
at 17.
39. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, Bailey v. City of
Philadelphia, supra note 11.
40. See Weiser & Goldstein, supra note 1, at A1.
41. Holly Otterbein, Stop-and-Frisk Should be Stopped and Questioned, PHILLY.COM (Nov. 9,
2010, 8:21 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/our-money/Stop-and-frisk_should_be_stopp
ed_and_questioned.html.
42. Id. N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK 2012, at 3 (2013), available at
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/2012_Report_NYCLU_0.pdf.
43. Alex Wigglesworth, ACLU: Philly Police Stop-and-Frisk Problems Persist, METRO
(March 19, 2013), http://www.metro.us/newyork/news/2013/03/19/aclu-philly-police-stop-andfrisk-problems-persist/.
44. New York peaked at over 685,724 stops in 2011. N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note
42. New York reported 191,558 stops in 2013. Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
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incredibly high stop rate overall.45 As evidenced by the data, things
have not changed in Philadelphia. This makes one wonder whether the
cooperative approach might not be superior to the adversarial one for
institutions seeking to maintain current practices.
QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This leads to one final set of questions: even after getting past all of
the challenges of measuring the legality of stop-and-frisk programs, if
one does find problems, how does one bring about change? How do
police departments implement reform? Bringing about change in large
complicated organizations like a major city’s police force is well
beyond the scope of this Essay, but is ultimately the final step in
ensuring that police keep citizens safe while respecting the Constitution.

45. See Plaintiffs’ Fourth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices, supra note
35 (noting that in the first quarter of 2013, there were 1126 pedestrian stops, 487 of which were
made without reasonable suspicion, and 196 pedestrian frisks, 106 of which were made without
reasonable suspicion).

